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Catholic Social Teaching and Global Migration:
Bridging the Paradox of Universal Human Rights
and Territorial Self-Determination
Vincent D. Rougeaut
1. INTRODUCTION
In this essay, I will consider how law, religion, and democratic plu-
ralism revolve around a particular issue: global migration. I use the term
"global migration" to encompass a number of related issues that are often
collapsed under the term "immigration." In nations that have constructed
their identities around waves of settlers or migrants-places like the
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand-immigration in-
volves the formal reception of foreigners into the host country as poten-
tial new citizens.' This is just one part of the migration of peoples
around the globe. Migration also encompasses emigration, asylum, eco-
nomic migration, and undocumented or irregular immigration. This lar-
ger collection of human movements presents new challenges to democ-
ratic nations in a global environment in which most have explicitly
committed themselves to certain fundamental, democratic values and
human rights norms. Furthermore, these same values relate closely to
core notions of Christianity. Catholic social teaching is a tradition within
Christianity that emphasizes the dignity of the human person and, as
such, complements and supports key liberal values essential to democ-
racy and modem human rights discourse.
Global migration demonstrates the difficult choices a firm com-
mitment to these values presents to even the most advanced democracies.
In the United States, undocumented migration from Mexico and Central
America has caused a great deal of political and social turmoil; has ex-
t Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School. This Essay grows out of my presentation at the
Seattle University School of Law's March 7, 2008 Symposium, Pluralism, Religion & the Law.
1. Will Kymlicka calls these the "countries of immigration," which "legally admit immigrants
as permanent residents and future citizens." WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL ODYSSEYS 73
(2007).
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posed ugly, nativist tendencies in American culture; and has exacerbated
class tensions, calling into question the American commitment to an
open society that welcomes the poor and persecuted.2
Nevertheless, the American debate over undocumented immigra-
tion and immigration reform offers an excellent way to frame progressive
and creative ideas about the relationship between Catholic social thought
and democratic pluralism. In this essay, I will demonstrate how religious
ideas can be used to strengthen our democratic commitment to universal
human rights. Both Catholic social teaching and various strains of liberal
political theory point to similar paths out of dilemmas over the admission
and status of migrants in democratic societies. Moreover, both reveal
new ways these societies might reform notions of citizenship and mem-
bership in ways that offer equality of esteem to all human beings.
My essay is organized around three major themes. First, I explore
the ways in which Catholic social teaching addresses human dignity, the
plight of the poor, and the promotion of global justice. I argue that this
theme provides an important bridge between secular and religious con-
ceptions of human rights.
Second, I argue that pluralism, particularly that which results from
religious diversity and multi-ethnic, diasporic identities, is now a funda-
mental part of political and cultural life in the wealthy democracies of
Europe and North America. The diversity within these societies is both a
cause and a product of their wealth, as well as a response to their strong
commitments to democratic principles, particularly human equality.
Third, I consider how liberal political theory offers a secular under-
standing of human dignity that has much in common with Catholic social
teaching. As an example, I consider Seyla Benhabib's argument that the
global migration of peoples demands a vision of justice that recognizes a
right to membership.
Finally, I conclude by arguing that Catholic social teaching sup-
ports Benhabib's concept of a human right to membership and that the
goal of a well-functioning liberal democracy should be to transform
strangers into citizens.
II. CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING, MIGRATION, AND HUMAN DIGNITY
Catholic social teaching has long argued that the rights to emigrate
and migrate are fundamental to human persons. In their pastoral letter,
2. See, e.g., Leonard Zeskind, The New Nativism: The Alarming Overlap Between White Na-
tionalists and Mainstream Anti-Immigrant Forces, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Wash., D.C.), Nov. 1,
2005. at A 15.
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Strangers No Longer, the bishops of the United States and Mexico sum-
marized the current state of Catholic teaching:
The Church recognizes the right of a sovereign state to control its
borders in furtherance of the common good. It also recognizes the
right of human persons to migrate so that they can realize their God-
given rights. These teachings complement each other. While the
sovereign state may impose reasonable limits on immigration, the
common good is not served when the basic human rights of the in-
dividual are violated. In the current condition of the world, in
which global poverty and persecution are rampant, the presumption
is that persons must migrate in order to support and protect them-
selves and that nations who are able to receive them should do so
whenever p6ssible.
3
This general statement draws on a number of key principles of
Catholic social teaching that, although sensitive to the needs of the na-
tion-state to promote the common good of its citizen-members, ulti-
mately give priority to the needs of immigrants and migrants in most
situations. For the purposes of this essay, I will highlight four principles:
the dignity of the human person, the person in community, the common
good, and the preferential option for the poor.
The dignity of the human person in Catholic social teaching is
based on an understanding of men and women as created in God's image
and likeness. This concept, known as the imago Dei, means that human
beings have a unique relationship with the divine, a relationship rooted in
the idea of the Incarnation--God taking human form. Human dignity is
not negotiable or earned. It is not dependent on our attributes or our be-
havior. It is an inseparable part of our humanity and it is the driving
force behind the Christian notion that human life is sacred. To promote
and protect the dignity of human life, Catholic social teaching sees hu-
man beings as inherently social beings whose personalities can be fully
realized only in relationships with others.
The person in community is another core principle of Catholic so-
cial teaching. This is one principle in which Catholic teaching and tradi-
tion part with social contract theories of liberalism. Social contract theo-
ries typically proceed from an understanding of a "state of nature" in
which human beings were lone rights-bearers who eventually had to cede
individual rights to the community or the state in recognition of the ne-
3. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, A Pastoral Letter Concerning Migration from the
Catholic Bishops of Mexico and the United States 39 (Jan. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.usccb.org/mrs/stranger.shtm.
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cessity of joining together in certain instances. 4 This foundational as-
sumption of the autonomous individual creates an environment in which
claims of community are seen as negative intrusions on human dignity.
These claims serve a need so critical that the intrusion they cause to indi-
vidual autonomy or self-ownership can reasonably be seen as a lesser
evil. On the other hand, Catholic social teaching views community as an
essential part of human existence, inseparable from any meaningful un-
derstanding of what is required to pursue a life of dignity.5 The life of an
individual is not diminished when certain aspects of one's autonomy are
sacrificed to strengthen community but enhanced. The emphasis of
Catholic social teaching on the social dimension of the person has meant
that Catholic thinking typically sees an essential role for states in the en-
hancement of the well-being of both citizens and the community.
Promotion of the common good is a third core principle of Catholic
social teaching. Unlike those whose perspectives are rooted in social
contract theory, Catholic social teaching does not see the common good
as the sum of the good of individuals-an empty space in which indi-
viduals have as much freedom as possible to maximize their own vision
of the good.6 The common good in Catholic teaching exists separate and
apart from the good of individuals, and it is something that grows out of
7life in community. In this respect, it is intimately linked to Catholic no-
tions of justice, which are evaluated on three levels.
First, commutative justice requires reciprocity in exchanges be-
tween individuals and seeks equivalence in what is gained and lost on
both sides of an exchange. 8 But this understanding of justice as a quid
pro quo is incomplete. A full conception of justice attempts to assess the
broader social context in which exchanges take place. "The power rela-
tions operative in the social context of an exchange must be considered
before determining that the agreement is just."9
Second, contributive, or social, justice requires that the various al-
locations of goods, income, and power in a society be evaluated in light
of the effects those arrangements have on those whose basic needs are
4. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES
MEMBERSHIP 9-14 (2006), for an excellent discussion of the social contract theory as exemplified
by the philosophical work of John Rawls.
5. "[H]uman dignity can only be realized and protected in solidarity with others. In Catholic
social thought, therefore, respect for human rights and a strong sense of both personal and commu-
nity responsibility are linked, not opposed." U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC
JUSTICE FOR ALL 45 (10th anniversary ed. 1997) [hereinafter ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL].
6. Id.
7. JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 49-50 (John J. Fitzgerald trans.,
1947).
8. DAVID HOLLENBACH, S.J., THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 193 (2002).
9.Id. at 195.
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unmet. "Contributive justice requires that citizens be active members of
the community, using their agency not only for their own good but for
the good of the community as well."' 10 In other words, it seeks to situate
justice for individuals within the context of the common good.
Third, distributive justice "is, in turn, concerned with the way the
members of society share in the goods that their life together makes pos-
sible. It deals with the allocation of the common good in a way that
leads to the welfare or well-being of members." 1
The preferential option for the poor, a fourth concept of Catholic
social teaching, arises when these visions of justice are considered in
tandem with the common good. 12 Serious attention to the common good,
human dignity, and the social nature of the human person makes the pre-
ferential option for the poor a logical outgrowth of those principles.1
3
Both the Hebrew Scriptures and the Gospels are heavily imbued with
admonitions to the faithful to direct their attention to the needs of the
poor. The preferential option takes this scriptural tradition, and the tradi-
tion of Catholic social teaching, and draws from them an understanding
that Christians are obliged to be specially concerned with the poor.
"Preferential" is not preference in the sense that the poor are "bet-
ter" than other people or more loved by God. Preferential means that a
Christian's attention must first be directed to the weak, the outcast, and
the marginalized. Thus, when we consider human dignity, life in com-
munity, and the common good, we must be particularly aware of the
needs of the least powerful among us. How do our economic, political,
and legal decisions affect those who are least able to speak for them-
selves and who are more often than not in the worst position to bear sac-
rifices that might be necessary for the common good? The preferential
option is about making decisions after first considering how the least
amongst us will fare and, in this way, is a particularization of the broader
notions of contributive and distributive justice.
10. Id. at 196.
11. Id. at 197. Another useful description of the various forms of justice in the Catholic social
tradition can be found in ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 5.
12. The concept grew out of discussions of the Latin American bishops that began at Medallin,
Columbia, in 1968 and thereafter developed by the theologian Gustavo Gutierrez. See generally
GUSTAVO GUTItRREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND SALVATION (Sister
Caridad Inda and John Eaglson eds. & trans., rev. ed. 1988) (1971).
13. See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Centesimus Annus 57 (May 1, 1991),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/johnpaulii/encyclicals/documents/hfjp-iienc_01
051991 centesimus-annus en.html.
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III. THE PLURALIST REALITY OF MODERN DEMOCRACY
The current condition of most Western democracies is one in which
people from numerous ethnic, religious, and racial backgrounds find
themselves living together, sharing public space, and struggling to forge
community out of diversity. Within these democracies, there is wide-
spread agreement on the acceptability of certain constitutional or basic
law norms. One of these principles is that all human beings should enjoy
equality of esteem.
[E]ach of us counts.., we are each equally worthy of esteem. This
esteem is not on account of what we do, or how we look, or how
bright we are, or what colour we are, or where we come from, or
our ethnic group: it is simply on account of the fact that we are....
What esteem requires of us is that we see individuals ... as first and
foremost particular persons, just like us. Human rights is in this
sense a visibility project: its driving focus is to get us to see the
people around us, particularly those whom we might otherwise...
not see at all, or those whom we would try to ignore if we did catch
a glimpse of them. It follows that, at its core, human rights is a sub-
ject that is concerned with the outsider, with the marginalised, and
with the powerless.14
The concept of the equal dignity of all human persons finds expression in
different ways in different systems, but it is something that all legitimate
democracies embrace, as is evidenced in numerous international agree-
ments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Indeed, the
principle finds widespread support around the world, and it forms the
basis of international human rights. Although many nations pay only lip-
service to this idea, most nations feel obliged to justify their actions
based on the shared global understanding of the centrality of this equality
norm.
Yet, even in mature and flourishing democracies, difficulties with
the idea of equality often arise. Religious or ethical differences may
produce conflicts in which citizens may agree on a value, like equality of
esteem writ large, but disagree on its application in particular cases.
Such disagreement creates very difficult conditions for the formation of
coherent law and policy. Take, for example, the issue of abortion in the
United States. Although most Americans believe abortion should be il-
legal in some cases, 15 there is widespread disagreement when a fetus
14. CONOR GEARTY, CAN HUMAN RIGHTS SURVIVE? 4-5 (2006).
15. See, for example, a recent Quinnipiac University poll from July 2008 in which only 19% of
survey respondents thought abortion should be "legal in all cases," as opposed to 14% who thought
it should be "illegal in all cases." Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ. Polling Inst., American Voters
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reaches a stage of development in which it should be treated as a human
being.16 This disagreement extends within and across religious tradi-
tions, as well as between religious believers and non-believers.
Furthermore, even when specific applications of these principles are
not at issue, differences of opinion often exist as to why a particular prin-
ciple deserves support or what types of behavior the principle encom-
passes. For example, despite general agreement in French and British
civil society on the basic equality principle, is equality of esteem ad-
vanced or undermined when Muslim women in France wear headscarves
in public schools? Should Muslim women fully covered in the chador be
allowed to present themselves to vote in British elections without reveal-
ing their faces? Even in a state where Islam is the dominant religion, like
Turkey, these questions have caused extraordinary controversy when
considered in light of the core values of a secular, democratic state. One
fairly straightforward application of the principle of equality is respect
for individual conscience. As Martha Nussbaum noted,
[T]he argument for religious liberty and equality in the [American
constitutional] tradition begins from a special respect for the faculty
in human beings with which they search for life's ultimate meaning.
This faculty was held to be present in all human beings in such a
way as to make human beings equal: anyone who has it (and all
humans do) is worthy of boundless respect, and that respect should
be equally given to high and low, male and female, to members of
the religions one likes and also to members of religions one hates.
17
Thus, democratic citizenship does not necessarily demand shared
agreement on the first principles underlying the constitutional or basic
law of the state; yet, accession to and respect for the core values and
principles of the basic law are necessary if the society is to have stability
and cohesion. This means the concept of a nation as coterminous with a
core ethnic, racial, or religious homogeneity is increasingly unsustainable
if our commitments to human rights, like freedom of conscience, free-
dom of religion, and freedom from ethnic and religious discrimination,
are to flourish in democratic settings. 18 This does, however, raise the
Oppose Same-Sex Marriage Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds, But They Don't Want Gov-
ernment to Ban It (July 17, 2008), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x I 295.xml?Release ID=l 194.
16. See Yuval Levin, Public Opinion and the Embryo Debates, THE NEW ATLANTIS, Spring
2008, at 47-62, available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/public-opinion-and-the-
embryo-debates.
17. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION OF
RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 19 (2007).
18. For a contrary view, see SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO
AMERICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004). I consider and reject Huntington's view and offer an alter-
2009]
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question of whether democratic states can be organized around the idea
of giving priority of place to certain cultural attributes of a dominant
group of citizens, like language in Quebec or Judaism in Israel. 19
Forcing immigrants and migrants to completely abandon their pre-
vious identities and commitments in order to enter in full relationship
with the members of their new, host societies seems inconsistent with the
values of democratic pluralism. The old assimilation models that co-
erced immigrants to become more ethnically French, English, or Ameri-
can-whatever that meant-are no longer acceptable in many Western
democracies.20 Increasingly, migrants and immigrants do not see them-
selves primarily as the recipients of acts of beneficence or charity in
which they take on the posture of grateful supplicants willing to do what-
ever it takes to "fit in." Today, respect for cultural diversity, human
rights, and global justice in democratic societies suggests that immigrants
may have certain entitlements to entry, as well as a right to shape their
new societies.
The global economy and global inequality demand a more complex
understanding of why people migrate. Lack of economic opportunity
around the world has made it impossible for many people to achieve a
basic standard of living for themselves, much less raise their standards of
living in ways that would allow them to form families and raise healthy
children. In some countries, like the Philippines, men and women with
professional qualifications find that, while no suitable employment is
available in their home countries, their skills are in demand in other plac-
es around the world. Add to this the never-ending cycle of war, famine,
and political repression that victimizes millions, as well as the ethically
burdened relationships many developed nations have both with their
former colonies and with nations whose puppet-regimes long did their
bidding. All of these issues contribute to the "push" and "pull" factors
that encourage all types of global migration.
Once migrants arrive in wealthy, pluralist democracies, new ques-
tions arise concerning the migrants' place in the social and the political
fabric of their host nations. We see increasingly that the models of as-
similation and homogenization of nation-state cultures are falling out of
favor:
native view in my recent book: VINCENT D. ROUGEAU, CHRISTIANS IN THE AMERICAN EMPIRE:
FAITH AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2008).
19. For two interesting perspectives on this question, see CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL
ARGUMENTS 186 (1995) and Na'ama Carmi, Immigration Policy: Between Demographic Considera-
tions and Preservation of Culture, 2 LAW & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. (Issue 1, art. 14) (2008).
20. Will Kymlicka & Keith Banting, Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State,
20.3 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 281, 288 (2006).
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A wide range of justifications have been offered historically for this
pursuit of national homogeneity. In some contexts, it was argued
that the state needed to be more unified in order to effectively de-
fend itself against external or internal enemies .... But these sorts
of justifications were also typically buttressed by racialist and eth-
nocentric ideologies which asserted that the language and culture of
minority groups and indigenous peoples were backward and infe-
rior, if not barbaric, unworthy of respect or protection.
21
This recognition has led to the development of the idea of liberal,
multicultural states. In such an environment, it becomes difficult to in-
sist that immigrants abandon their previous identities and commitments
in order to become members of their host societies. Furthermore, given
the important questions of global injustice that have caused much of the
movement of peoples around the world, it is inappropriate to see mi-
grants and immigrants as supplicants who are lucky to be admitted. If
notions of justice and responsibility are taken seriously, immigrants and
migrants have certain entitlements of entry and rights to shape their host
society going forward. Relationship and dialogue that respect human
dignity assume that both parties have the right to define the terms of the
association and to influence the outcome of the discussion.
IV. THE GLOBAL COMMON GOOD
Over the last fifty years, these principles have been given global
applicability. Although the principles of Catholic social teaching and
liberal democracy were developed through the observation of social and
political relations within nation-states, the understanding of society in
Catholic teaching is no longer limited to the nation-state construct. Since
the Second Vatican Council, the "social question" that Catholic social
teaching addresses must be considered both within and without the
boundaries of nation-states. For instance, in his 1963 encyclical Pacem
in terris, Pope John XXIII
contributed to the Catholic understanding of the common good by
recognizing the inadequacy of the term if applied only within the
boundaries of the nation-state. The common good is increasingly a
global reality. In Pacem in terris, John observed that "the present
[international] system of organization and the way its principle of
21. KYMLICKA, supra note 1, at 64-65.
2009]
Seattle University Law Review
authority operates on a world basis no longer correspond to the ob-
jective requirements of the universal common good. 'T 2
Catholic social teaching is directed to a global social question. The
common good the teachings describe is not only the good produced by
life within societies, but also a global common good resulting from the
interaction of nation-states. It is in light of these principles and their in-
ternational ramifications that we should consider the tremendous intellec-
tual support Catholic social teaching can bring to a discussion of how to
create a better system to regulate global migration. The Catholic values,
which assume the dignity of the migrant, recognize the dramatic imbal-
ance of wealth and power in the global order and grant a preferential op-
tion towards migrants. These values should be a necessary part of any
solution that can legitimately claim to be just.
When Catholic social teaching is considered in the context of the
current global debate around migration, there is a clear nexus between
the teaching and international human rights discourse. Catholic social
teaching does not recognize nation-state sovereignty as a legitimate bar
to migrants' quests to secure the minimal conditions necessary to digni-
fied human existence. Thus, all nations, within the limits of their ability,
have a moral responsibility to accept refugees and asylum seekers. This,
however, is a fairly basic requirement. States may well have an obliga-
tion to accept immigrants and other migrants because Catholic teaching
and modem international law are moving-or perhaps more appropri-
ately, lurching-away from the idea of the Westphalian nation-state as
the only model for the organization of the global order. This obligation
may extend even to those who move for reasons beyond basic survival.
Historically, European and North American nations were able to in-
tegrate diverse peoples into their "empires" through a political and eco-
nomic system that depended heavily upon their ability to dominate
weaker nations and force certain cultural standards on subject peoples.
By imposing economic relations and cultural values on those societies
and their populations, these subordinate nations were brought into a
global system on terms designed to favor the dominant world powers.
The modem conundrum is: can a global system continue to work if it is
premised on the equality of nation-states, rather than on the domination
and stigmatization of the weak by the strong?23 The dangers of too
heavy a reliance on nation-state sovereignty when the needs of human
22. Marvin L. Mich, Commentary on Mater et Magistra (Christianity and Social Progress), in
MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 191, 199 (Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M. ed., 2005) (quoting
Pope John XXIII, Encyclical Letter, Pacem in Terris 134 (Apr. 11, 1963)).
23. STEPHEN CASTLES & ALASTAIR DAVIDSON, CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION:
GLOBALIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING 3 (2000).
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beings are concerned have become readily apparent over the last century.
Apart from the obvious examples of the two world wars, more recent
crises in the Balkans and the Caucuses have shown the growing incom-
patibility between democratic values and the notion of ethnically ho-
mogenous nation-states. Clearly, the time has come for a serious discus-
sion of alternative ways of understanding the relationship between the
fundamental rights of persons and political authority.
At least six variations of state sovereignty are offered by Simon
Caney in Justice Beyond Borders.24 One particular variation worth not-
ing, due in part to its strong relationship to the idea of subsidiarity in
Catholic social thought, is a political framework in which nation-states
lack comprehensiveness. "Under such an arrangement ... small units
have authority for issues x, y, and z, but other larger institutions have
authority for other matters. Neither class of institutions would be con-
,25
ventionally classified as a state."
In Catholic social teaching, subsidiarity is a principle that seeks to
empower individuals and groups at every level of society. On the one
hand, subsidiarity limits the intervention of the state to matters that are
best addressed by those most intimately affected by them. This is often
understood as a negative aspect of solidarity in that it restricts the actions
of the state in the lives of individuals and communities. On the other
hand, a positive aspect of subsidiarity recognizes that larger groups and
higher structures in society, like the state, are often in the best position to
take on certain tasks to promote the common good, and in so doing, it
allows the lower or smaller groups to accomplish their tasks more effec-
tively.
26
Caney's political model of a less comprehensive state recognizes
that power is distributed based on different needs and competencies at
different levels. It is an interesting and creative actualization of the sub-
sidiarity idea. In Great Britain, for instance, there is increasing pressure
for devolution of power to its constituent entities, particularly Scotland.
An important rationale for this is that the interests and needs of the peo-
ple of Scotland are different enough from those in England that more
decisions need to be made at a political level closer to the people-in
Edinburgh rather than in London. Yet, a quasi-independent or autono-
mous Scotland would still submit to a host of restrictions on its sovereign
power through its participation in the European Union, including those
involving human rights protections. Thus, an "independent" Scotland
24. SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY 150-51 (2005).
25. Id. at 151.
26. See Johann Verstraeten, Solidarity and Subsidiarity, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL
TEACHING 133, 135-136 (David A. Boileau ed., 1998).
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remains tethered to the European community of nations and the global
community in ways that leave many major aspects of sovereign power to
higher level institutions. After exploring a number of variations and con-
sidering historical examples, Caney concludes,
[W]e should not treat the predominately statist character of the
world system for the last three centuries as a fixed feature of the
way the world is. To do so is to ignore the rich variety of earlier po-
litical systems .... These points remind us of the important but of-
ten neglected fact that there could be, and have been, alternatives to
a statist framework
27
Catholic teaching sees the nation-state as a means for advancing
human dignity through its promotion of the common good. At different
places and times in history, other means have been better suited to this
task. The 21st century may well be a transitional era in this regard. In-
deed, Yasemin Soysal argues that "the emergence of universal person-
hood is rapidly eroding the territorially bounded nation-state ...
[U]niversal entitlements are still basically delivered by the nation-state
but are no longer limited by formal citizenship. The furthest-going ex-
pression of the trend is the transnational citizenship laid down by the
EU.
,28
Given the longstanding support in modem Catholic thinking for the
development of global institutions-respecting, of course, the concept of
subsidiarity-and its modem resistance to any direct support for particu-
lar geo-political arrangements, there is nothing in the current move away
from the nation-state model that would be inconsistent with the Catholic
emphasis on the dignity of the human person. When this is combined
with Catholic teaching's rich understanding of justice in its commutative,
distributive, and contributive forms, Catholic teaching offers strong sup-
port for an approach to global migration that places unique obligations
on the world's wealthiest nations to offer citizenship to a much larger
number of these people than is currently the case. Just as wealthy citi-
zens have obligations to place the needs of their poorest and weakest fel-
low citizens at the forefront of discussions of law and public policy, so
too must the wealthy nations of the world consider the needs of poorer
nations. This is especially true when confronted with global migration
rooted in disparities of wealth, inequality in the distribution of global
resources, and lack of meaningful social participation for huge numbers
of the world's poor.
27. CANEY, supra note 24, at 151-52.
28. CASTLES & DAVIDSON, supra note 23, at 18 (citing YASEMIN SOYSAL, LIMITS OF
CITIZENSHIP (1994)).
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V. A COSMOPOLITAN VISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE AMERICAN CONTEXT
Seyla Benhabib argues that, given the growing consensus around an
understanding of liberalism that sees all human persons as bearers of cer-
tain fundamental rights, it is time to recognize a fundamental right for
temporary residents of democratic societies to seek reasonable opportuni-
ties for citizenship in democratic societies. 29 As preliminary background
to frame her argument, Benhabib has offered a compelling description of
the current global situation as it relates to migration from the developing
to the developed world:
Transformations in patterns of migration are leading more and more
individuals to retain ties with their home countries and not to under-
take total immersion in their new countries. The ease provided by
globalized networks of transportation, communication, electronic
media, banking, and financial services is producing guest workers,
seasonal workers, dual nationals, and diasporic communities ...
Migrations thus lead to a pluralization of allegiances and commit-
ments and to the growing complexity of nationals who, more often
than not in today's world, are also ex-, post-, and neo-colonials. We
are witnessing the increasing migration from periphery to center,
encouraged by wide differentials in standards of living between re-
gions of the world, and facilitated by the large presence of family
and kin already at the center of what was once the Empire.
30
In this new global reality, Benhabib notes that democracies face a
dilemma rooted, on the one hand, in their commitments to values that are
assumed to have universal validity and, on the other, to an understanding
of democracy as functioning only within bounded geo-political commu-
nities with particular national and cultural identities. In a democracy,
citizenship grants the right of participation that not only gives an indi-
vidual a role in conferring authority upon the sovereign, but also bestows
upon the individual rights, privileges, and protections that are recognized
by the national community through its basic or constitutional law.
Increasingly, however, these rights, privileges, and protections have
been encompassed within human rights norms that are seen as belonging
to all persons qua persons.31 In other words, the rights do not depend
necessarily on membership in a particular nation-state, they are univer-
sal. Respect for those rights, or their vindication, may vary based on the
29. See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS
(2004).
30. Seyla Benhabib, Democracy, Demography, and Sovereignty, 2 LAW & ETHICS OF HUM.
RTS. (Iss. 1) art. 2, at 10 (2008).
31. GEARTY, supra note 14, at 5-6.
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political community in which an individual finds himself; but, as a theo-
retical matter, the rights belong to all human beings. In this environ-
ment, the concept of citizenship becomes somewhat overburdened:
The discourse of liberal democracies is necessarily caught in this
tension created by the context- and community-transcending valid-
ity dimension of human rights on the one hand, and the historically
formed, culturally generated, and socially shaped specificities of ex-
isting juridico-civil communities on the other. The point is not to
deny this tension by embracing only one or another of these moral
alternatives, but to negotiate their interdependence, by resituating or
reiterating the universal in concrete contexts. 32
Immigration and migration in the wealthy democracies of the world
provide an ideal "concrete context" in which to examine this interde-
pendence, and Benhabib offers a proposal for negotiating the conflicting
claims of universal human rights and nation-specific citizenship.
Given the reality of global migration and the important issues of
justice that lie at its root, Benhabib argues that a democratic society can-
not deny membership in perpetuity to individuals who have entered its
territory. Indeed, the international community has come to regard the
arbitrary denationalization of an individual as a violation of basic human
rights norms. For Benhabib, this right to citizenship requires recognition
of a companion right to membership.33
A right to membership means that once a foreigner is admitted into
a democratic community, he or she must be offered reasonable opportu-
nities to become a member-citizen. Democracies cannot tolerate perma-
nent strangers or second-class, pseudo-citizens. The long-term existence
of these non-members calls into question the community's commitment
to the concept of equality of esteem for all human beings. Michael Wal-
zer noted this in the early 1980s when he considered the status of guest
workers in Europe.34 He also noted,
One might insist, as I shall ultimately do ... that every immigrant
and every resident is a citizen, too-or, at least, a potential citizen.
That is why territorial admission is so serious a matter. The mem-
bers must be prepared to accept, as their own equals in a world of
shared obligations, the men and women they admit; the immigrants
must be prepared to share the obligations.
35
32. BENHABIB, supra note 29, at 133-34.
33.Id. at 135.
34. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 56-61 (1983).
35. Id. at 52.
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Both Benhabib's and Walzer's observations raise important ques-
tions about the status of undocumented workers in the United States.
Benhabib's vision of just membership would call for reasonable paths to
citizenship for those legally admitted, and it may go further to suggest
that the United States has some obligation to admit a certain number of
"economic refugees" who have been displaced by the gross inequalities
of the global economic system. For those who have entered legally, the
right to membership entails a right for a foreigner to know how the con-
ditions of naturalization can be fulfilled, and the system in place must be
transparent: "One must not criminalize the immigrant and the foreigner;
one must safeguard their right to due process, to representation in one's
language, and the right to independent counsel. 36
But what about those who have entered sovereign territory in viola-
tion of laws of the community in which they now seek to make their
lives? Should they have a right to membership? Although individual
circumstances of undocumented migrants vary, many have crossed into
the territory of the United States as a predictable result of choices freely
made by American political and economic elites. Given the willingness
of large segments of American society to take advantage of the economic
benefits made possible by the availability of inexpensive, undocumented
labor, I argue that the "illegality" of many of these territorial admissions
should represent no more than a hurdle to citizenship for these resident
aliens. When distributive and contributive justice are taken into account,
barring them permanently from citizenship is morally unjustifiable. It
demeans the American commitment to democracy and human rights.
Furthermore, rounding up undocumented migrants for deportation
smacks of ethnic cleansing, population exchanges, and other attempts to
"purify" national polities; and all of these, in the end, degrade the hu-
manity of everyone involved.
In the case of undocumented migrants to the United States, a huge
portion of these admissions were actively sought by certain Americans,
or were acquiesced in by others. They were the result of what can be
reasonably seen as an immigration policy that illegitimately restricts un-
skilled labor from the developing world, despite the pressing need for
these workers in numerous sectors of the American economy. Denying
membership to these migrants also ignores the ways in which admission
to citizenship could level the playing field for some of the world's least
advantaged people.
36. BENHABIB, supra note 29, at 140.
2009]
Seattle University Law Review
VI. CONCLUSION: COSMOPOLITAN NORMS, DISAGGREGATED
CITIZENSHIP, AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT
If we truly believe that core democratic and human rights values are
universal in their scope and application, we must be willing to think
more seriously about a world order based on cosmopolitan norms and
federal structures encompassing nation-states within these norms. As
Caney has argued, these structures may take any number of forms. The
regional model of the European Union offers one hopeful example, but it
does not have to be the only one. Both Benhabib and Caney suggest that
political identities do not have to be understood in state-centric terms.
Both suggest that devolutionary developments around the world exem-
plify the use of the principle of subsidiarity as a way to improve democ-
ratic participation under a more general, cosmopolitan framework of hu-
man rights, political and economic rights, and rich justice norms, as un-
derstood in the Catholic social tradition. We are still in the early days of
the development of these alternative structures, and I am not arguing that
the nation-state is no longer relevant. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of
global migration, the growth of world cities, and the expansion of dias-
poric cultures around the globe (including a Mexican-American one here
in the United States) all suggest that the time has come to reconsider our
understanding of the nation-state.
Domestically, more and more States are being confronted with the
need to operate under multi-cultural political models. We should en-
courage this development as part of a richer understanding of how de-
mocracies go about the business of respecting human rights and nurtur-
ing human dignity. The ugliness and evil that often result from conflat-
ing ethnicity with democracy are never far away. In recent months, Ra-
dovan Karadzic has been captured and brought to trial at The Hague for
leading a murderous rampage of ethnic cleansing through the Balkans.
His capture, however, has done nothing to stop the Russians from mov-
ing into Georgia and unleashing attacks against ethnic Georgians within
Russian territory. The tribal mentality of us versus them is no doubt a
part of human nature, but both the traditions of democratic liberalism and
Catholic humanism have offered alternatives that are just as deeply
rooted in our spiritual and intellectual patrimony.
Fencing the world out is a morally unacceptable choice. The Unit-
ed States and the other democracies of the world have particularly impor-
tant responsibilities to the global common good, both as the wealthiest
members of the community of nations and as believers in, and promoters
of, the existence of universal human rights. As citizens of a democracy,
we must understand that decisions to migrate are rarely products of indi-
vidual choices alone, but tend to be the result of complex interactions of
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personal, domestic, and global forces. We must, therefore, acknowledge
our role in the creation or maintenance of some of those forces, and we
must also decide what types of legal and policy decisions are consistent
with our moral and political commitments.
Democratic pluralism requires compromise in the public sphere.
As the ethnic and religious make-up of our nations change, we cannot
impose a static understanding of what is acceptable based solely on the
prejudices of previously dominant ethno-cultural groups, particularly if it
creates impossible tensions with our commitments to democratic princi-
ples and widely held human rights norms. Religious values and the
voices of people of faith have a positive role to play in relieving this ten-
sion. Catholic social thought offers one perspective that is both person-
centered and cosmopolitan. It does not unduly elevate the sovereignty of
the nation-state, but draws a parallel between the individual in the do-
mestic community and the nation-state within the international commu-
nity, emphasizing rights and corresponding duties that limit unfettered
action of both the individual and the nation-state.
Finally, Benhabib's right to membership links core values of Catho-
lic social teaching and Catholic understanding of justice to important
modem currents of liberal political theory. Everyone has the right to be-
long to communities in which they can exercise the full range of activi-
ties that bring dignity to their lives. If this kind of membership and par-
ticipation cannot be achieved in one place, how can we justify preventing
human beings from realizing these opportunities elsewhere, particularly
when places exist that can accommodate them? Every person has a right
to dignified participation in the lives of communities of which he or she
is a part, regardless of legal status. Most importantly, everyone has a
right to be a person fully endowed with rights and duties-a someone,
somewhere.
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